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Introduction 
A good deal of the day-to-day business of educational and social research, the 
“practice architecture” of a discipline or a field of endeavour, as Kemmis (2012) calls 
it, revolves around debates about theory, methodology, and ethics. How should a 
particular social issue be theorised? How should an empirical investigation be 
framed? How should the fieldwork be designed and conducted? These are the 
intellectual questions which define a field of inquiry. But a field of inquiry is enacted 
and operationalized in material and institutional settings. Equally important questions, 
indeed perhaps more so at the present time, are who has the right to decide these 
matters? In whose interests is social research undertaken? Who decides what counts 
as ‘evidence’? And how is independent critical research, particularly critical 
qualitative research, to be funded and sustained in the face of government insistence 
on direct relevance to, and immediate impact on, social policy and intervention 
programs? Thus what we might term the ‘political economy’ of social research – what 
gets funded and why – is as important to the overall delineation and development of 
social research as the particular theoretical and methodological debates that frame a 
disciplinary field at any particular time. Intellectual questions and material contexts 
interact to produce the practice of social research at any particular historical moment.  
 
So it is at present. Educational and social research in general, qualitative 
approaches to educational research in particular, have been under sustained criticism 
for fifteen years and more, particularly from government but also from many 
researchers themselves who see an opportunity to advance their particular vision of 
social science. The argument is that qualitative approaches to educational and social 
research have not provided a sufficiently cumulative and robust evidence base for the 
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development of policy and practice, and in particular have not produced sufficient 
experimental data to allow policy makers to evaluate policy alternatives. Educational 
research in particular is criticised for being too much of a ‘cottage industry’, 
producing too many small-scale, disconnected, non-cumulative studies that do not 
provide convincing explanations of educational phenomena or how best to develop 
teaching and learning.  
 
Responses have included significant philosophical arguments rebutting the 
claim that straight-forward empirical evidence can be produced to identify cause and 
effect in social research; detailed arguments about the complex interaction of research 
and policy, again rejecting any straight-forward linkage; and the development of a 
range of arguments for and examples of mixed method approaches to social research. 
Nevertheless the calls for further development and expansion of experimental 
methods in social research continue. They are linked to arguments about the need to 
concentrate research resources (funding) on fewer centres of excellence undertaking  
much larger scale investigations and interventions, and to arguments about the need to 
focus on some (policy relevant) issues and topics at the expense of others.  The debate 
is not just about method, it is also about the scale and focus of inquiry. This chapter 
will review key elements of these debates, reflect on the implications for the field of 
qualitative research and its relationship to policy, and look to delineate the ground on 
which critical qualitative research can continue to be undertaken.  
 
The call for ‘better’ evidence 
Calls for the development of evidence-based policy and practice in education 
and social research raise many questions about the nature of evidence and the 
relationship between research, policy, practice, and the democratic process. Such calls 
seem self-evidently reasonable – who would argue against the use of evidence? Who 
could argue in favour of superstition-based practice? Yet the production and use of 
evidence is not straightforward and policy-makers can cite ‘the evidence’ when it 
suits them, and ignore it, invoking other political exigencies, when it does not. As 
Winston Churchill once famously remarked when discussing the relationship between 
science and democracy “Scientists should be on tap, not on top” (1949, quoted in 
Leach 2013, p. 298).   
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Evidence-based practice also appeals to ideas of rational planning and the self-
interest of some sections of the research community, privileging research knowledge 
above what is often characterised as traditional, ineffective professional practice.  
With respect to education, such calls ask ‘where is the secure research-derived 
knowledge-base of teachers and teaching?’ - simultaneously castigating the teaching 
profession for not having one, and the research community for not providing it 
(Hargreaves 1996; Slavin 2002). Comparisons are often made with medicine, which, 
it is claimed, does indeed have a well-proven knowledge base from which to select 
and apply treatments. Though within medicine itself, the debate is rather more 
complex and nuanced, especially when it comes to the interaction of treatments and 
patient decision-making – not all patients take their medicine (Barbour and Barbour 
2003). 
 
The debate about how educational research and, more generally, social 
research, might better serve policy is not a new debate, and has been revisited many 
times since the inception of educational and social research as established university-
based activities (e.g., Lagemann, 2000; Nisbet & Broadfoot; 1980; Weiss, 1972, 
1980). However, it has been addressed with new vigor since the late 1990s as 
successive governments in the USA, the UK, and elsewhere have looked for better 
value for money from research, and more particularly looked to research for 
legitimating and supportive endorsements of their policies. The debate carries 
particular import for those working in the broad field of qualitative inquiry since it has 
tended to privilege so-called ‘scientific’ approaches to educational and social 
research, by which is meant empirical investigations of educational activities and 
innovations, oriented to the identification of causality, explanation, and generalization 
(e.g. National Research Council, 2002). ‘Scientific‘ research has been extensively 
defined in US legislation, and includes reference to “measurements or observational 
methods that provide reliable and valid data across evaluators and observers… 
evaluated using experimental or quasi experimental designs…with a preference for 
random assignment experiments…“ (NCLB, 2002, 115 STAT. 1965). The argument 
of critics is that qualitative research is not scientific, or not scientific enough, and 
cannot produce definitive evidence about ‘what works‘ in social policy interventions. 
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Implicitly, therefore, and sometimes quite explicitly, qualitative approaches to 
research are marginalized. The debate seems to reflect both long-term changes in 
what we might call the ‘terms of trade’ between science and policy, along with more 
specific short-term jockeying for position amongst particular researchers and 
government officials/advisers at a particular point in time.  
 
The intensity and focus of the current debate in the UK can be dated from a 
speech in 1996 by David Hargreaves (then Professor of Education at Cambridge 
University) to the Teacher Training Agency (TTA—a government agency regulating 
teacher training). Hargreaves (1996) attacked the quality and utility of educational 
research, arguing that such research should produce an “agreed knowledge base for 
teachers” (p. 2) that “demonstrates conclusively that if teachers change their practice 
from X to Y there will a significant and enduring improvement in teaching and 
learning” (p. 5). Subsequent government-sponsored reviews and reports took their 
lead from this speech and produced what might be termed a mainstream policy 
consensus that the quality of educational research was low, particularly because so 
many studies were conducted on a small scale and employed qualitative methods, and 
therefore “something had to be done” (Hillage, Pearson, Anderson, & Tamkin, 1998; 
Tooley & Darby, 1998, Woodhead, 1998). That such claims were disputed need not 
detain us here (but see for example Hammersley, 1997, 2005; MacLure, 2003). It is 
worth noting, however, that subsequent analyses of papers published by the British 
Educational Research Journal, the leading UK journal of the British Educational 
Research Association, and of educational research projects funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), demonstrated that critics had 
misrepresented the field and that in fact a wide range of methods were and are 
employed in British educational research, including-large scale quantitative analysis, 
experimental design, and mixed methods (Gorard & Taylor, 2004; Torrance, 2008). 
 
The parallel intervention to Hargreaves in the USA is probably the National 
Research Council Report (2002) “Scientific Research in Education,” though this in 
turn was produced in response to already extant policy debate and legislation 
identifying what would be defined as “research” for purposes of federal funding—
specifically the Reading Excellence Act, 1999, and the No Child Left Behind Act, 
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2001 (see Baez & Boyles, 2009, pp. 5 ff., for illustration and discussion of these acts). 
A huge literature has been prompted by this legislation, subsequent attempts to 
delineate the boundaries of “scientific research in education” and responses to those 
attempts. For example extensive reviews were published in Educational Researcher, 
2002, vol. 31, no. 8; Qualitative Inquiry, 2004, vol. 10, no. 1; Teachers College 
Record, 2005, vol. 107, no. 1. More recently the debate has continued with responses 
seeking: 
to re-state some of the philosophical issues in identifying cause and effect and 
establish actionable knowledge in human affairs (Maxwell 2012, Morgan 2014);  
understand some of the pressures that policymakers are under when trying to collect 
and evaluate evidence (Donmoyer 2012);  
make visible some of the problems of publishing qualitative research in these new 
times (Ceglowski, Bacigalupa and Peck 2011);  
link Randomised Control Trials (RCT) into more mixed method research designs 
(Christ 2014, Hesse-Biber 2012);  
note the parallels between the evidence-based policy movement and colonialism 
(Shahjahan 2011);  
and reassert the distinctiveness and social justice aspirations of qualitative research 
(Denzin 2010).  
It is not my intention to review all of this work here, though I will return to the debate 
about mixed methods later in the paper. However, one quotation from the debate is 
worth highlighting, since in many respects it summarizes the “scientific” case, 
particularly the case for using not just a broadly quantitative empirical approach, but a 
specifically experimental design. Thus, Robert Slavin (2002), a leading proponent of 
the scientific method in the USA and inaugural Director of the Institute for Effective 
Education at the University of York, UK, argues that “the experiment is the design of 
choice for studies that seek to make causal conclusions, and particularly for 
evaluations of educational innovations” (p. 18.). And, in a turn of phrase that is 
directly reminiscent of Hargreaves’s (1996) speech, Slavin suggests that policy 
makers want to know “if we implement Program X instead of Program Y, or instead 
of our current program, what will be the likely outcomes for children?” (p. 18). 
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Thus we would appear to have two research communities talking past each 
other with little constructive engagement over legitimate criticisms or potentially 
common concerns. Proponents of experimental design are clearly in the ascendancy 
however and, as such, perhaps do not feel the need to engage. This certainly seems to 
be the case in the UK where the debate has been given renewed vigour by the 
publication of two recent government policy papers advocating far more use of RCTs 
in UK social policy and educational research. The papers were commissioned by the 
Cabinet Office Behavioural Insights Team (Haynes et. al. 2012) and the Department 
for Education  (Goldacre 2013). In many respects Goldacre’s paper on Education 
might be seen as ‘Hargreaves: 2.0’. In his own words, Goldacre’s paper is a “call to 
arms” (p.16). He sets up a rhetorical binary between educational research(ers) and 
proponents of randomised controlled trials. Educational researchers are positioned as 
ignorant (of RCTs), incompetent (in research design and methods), and uninterested 
in improving teaching and learning in the classroom; proponents of randomized 
controlled trials are positioned as knowledgeable, skilled, only looking to identify 
what’s in the best interests of children. Large parts of the paper draw on examples 
from medicine (again), and are completely (wilfully?) ignorant of the debates going 
on in the UK and USA. The paper ends, as many of these sorts of interventions tend 
to do, with a disciplinary ‘land grab’ for resources.  Goldacre (2013) concludes “We 
need academics with quantitative research skills from outside academic education 
departments – economists, demographers, and more, to come in and share their 
skills…” (p. 18). Ah, the economists, thank goodness for the economists, whose 
models and analysis have so helped us to produce such an effective banking system, 
and to develop our economies over the last few years. Their RCTs have really helped 
with that. Leaving aside the rhetoric however, the Cabinet Office and Goldacre papers 
have reignited the debate about RCTs in the UK policy context and influential 
research funders are now routinely looking for such designs in research proposals 
(e.g. the Education Endowment Fund: 
http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/apply-for-funding/ ).  
 
However, it is also important to recognize that these criticisms are not 
restricted to the USA and/or UK policy contexts, nor indeed are they restricted to 
educational research. Reviews of and attacks on the quality of educational research, 
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and particularly the quality of qualitative educational research, have impacted debate 
in Australia and New Zealand (Cheek, 2007; Middleton, 2009; Yates, 2004), and are 
emerging in Europe (Besley, 2009; Bridges, 2005, 2009; Brown, 2003, Depaepe 
2002; Frederiksen and Beck 2010). Similar debates about issues of relevance, utility 
and their relationship to definitions of research quality have been noted in other 
disciplines, for example Business Studies (Caswill and Wensley 2007), Social Policy 
(Brown 2010), and Anthropology (Mills and Ratcliffe 2012).  Critiques have also 
been leveled against social research more generally. In a speech to the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council in 2000, titled “Influence or Irrelevance” the then 
Secretary of State for Education, David Blunkett (2000), asserted that 
Many feel that too much social science research is inward-looking, 
too piecemeal, rather than helping to build knowledge in a 
cumulative way, and fails to focus on the key issues of concern to 
policy-makers, practitioners and the public, especially parents.  
More recently Schorr and Farrow (2011) note that the use of RCTs in social 
policy research is now advocated by the US Office of Management and 
Budgeting and they review the general trend across both government and 
philanthropic organizations to focus on a narrow range of experimental 
evidence when designing, implementing and evaluating a broad range of social 
intervention programs.     
Thus, when the previous edition of this Handbook was published in 
2011, the legislative concern to promote “scientific research in education” and 
particularly the place of RCTs in educational research was a fairly specific 
American phenomenon. Now it would appear to be far more widespread, both 
geographically and in terms of its reach across the full range of social policy 
research and research funders. Educational research, qualitative approaches to 
educational research, but also qualitative approaches to social research more 
generally have all come in for criticism and, taken together, suggest that 
qualitative inquiry is facing a global movement to reassert broadly empiricist 
and technicist approaches to the generation and accumulation of social scientific 
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“evidence” for policy making. The focus, worldwide, is on both methods and 
topics, seeking evidence to inform policy making, particularly evidence about 
“what works.” Elements of such a movement will differ in their origins, 
orientations, and specific national aspirations. But equally they do seem to 
represent a concerted attempt to impose (or perhaps reimpose) scientific 
certainty and a form of center-periphery, research, development, dissemination 
(RDD) system management on an increasingly complex and uncertain social 
world. 
Long-Term Trends: Whither/Wither Science and Government? 
Part of the backcloth to the current debate is the uncertain status and 
legitimacy of both science and government at the present time. The role, purpose, and 
utility of science and scientific research is less agreed upon and less secure than it 
once was, and with respect to this, just as educational research can be seen to be 
situated in a wider debate about social research, so social research can be seen to be 
located in a wider debate about scientific research and the role of science in society. 
In the UK, for most of the 20th century, the relationship between science and 
government was determined by the so-called “Haldane principle” (after Viscount 
Haldane, an influential liberal politician who chaired the committee that articulated 
the principle in 1918). This settlement essentially resolved that university-based 
science would be funded from the public purse to pursue fundamental research, which 
would in turn produce unpredictable, but nevertheless substantial, long-term scientific 
and technical benefit—i.e., “basic” research would, over time, produce the platform 
for more “applied” technological developments and benefits. The central tenet of this 
position is that the quality of basic research is grounded in the independent and 
disinterested pursuit of knowledge. This was even characterized as the creation and 
operation of the “independent republic of science” by Michael Polyani (1962, cited in 
Boden, Cox, Nedeva, & Barker, 2004). The Haldane principle has a direct parallel in 
the United States with the publication of Vannevar Bush’s “Science: The Endless 
Frontier” (1945). This argued, on the back of scientific successes apparent in the 
Second World War, for the federal government to significantly expand support for 
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scientific research on the basis of a similarly “arms length” linear model of “basic” 
research eventually leading to technological benefit. This led to the setting up of the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950 (see Greenberg, 2001).  
 
More recently, however, government calls for much more short-term 
responsiveness and utility have pervaded policy debates and aspirations on both sides 
of the Atlantic and elsewhere—e.g., the Clinton focus on science and technology 
policy in the 1990s (Greenberg, 2001), and the current UK government concern to 
identify and evaluate the “impact” of research through its new Research Excellence 
Framework (DBIS, 2009; Higher Education Funding Council for England [HEFCE], 
2009, 2014), the successor to the Research Assessment Exercise (Torrance, 2006). 
These calls for research to produce social and economic impact are in turn located in 
debates about the role of research in promoting economic growth, particularly in the 
context of globalization and constrained government budgets after the 2008 banking 
crash and global economic recession. Research is now expected to serve the 
development of each nation state’s ‘knowledge economy’. To this end, selectivity and 
concentration of research resources are particularly being pursued in the UK. A recent 
Government White Paper (i.e. a policy statement framing legislation) stated quite 
clearly that “we intend to maximize the impact of our research base on economic 
growth” (p. iv). It went on: “To compete effectively the UK must harness its strengths 
in…research…and its expertise in areas such as design and behavioural science…” 
(DBIS, 2011, p. 6). In essence the White Paper argues that investment in research 
should be oriented to those areas that promise most economic return, with “behavioral 
science” being deployed to understand and change people’s behavior in relation to 
key threats to economic development such as poor health and global security. 
Moreover the White Paper goes on to assert that major social and economic 
challenges “can only be resolved through interdisciplinary collaboration” (p. 20) and 
thus government will “actively support strong collaborations” (p. 8) across disciplines 
and institutions. In turn, the UK’s main social science funding body, the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) in its most recent ‘Strategic Plan’ includes a 
section on “Facilitating Partnerships and Realising Impact” which states: 
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We act as a broker to ensure that the academic community is fully aware of 
the ways that social science can help meet the needs of government, business 
and the third sector     (ESRC 2015, p. 14) 
Research, including social research, will be marshaled and directed in the national 
economic interest. 
 
Similar debates about purpose and level of government expenditure on social 
research can be observed in the USA in relation to calls to restrict NSF expenditure on 
the Social, Behavioural and Economic Sciences (SBE; Coburn 2011; Cantor and 
Smith 2013). Such calls have not gone unchallenged (Lempert 2013, Wilson 2013), 
though these responses tend to adopt the UK government’s position by arguing that 
restricting Federal funding to science and technology is short-sighted - the social 
sciences are central to understanding the interaction of humans with natural and 
technical systems, and thus are needed in order to understand issues of climate 
change, implementing technological change, and so forth. Such arguments accept the 
basic premise that science should serve policy in a much more direct way than 
hitherto. Thus science in general, and social science in particular, is now expected to 
serve government policy and economic development very directly. This clearly begs 
questions about how to define quality and utility. 
 
Equally, however, government itself is under pressure to “deliver,” especially 
in areas of public policy. Since the first oil crisis of the 1970s put severe pressure on 
public spending, especially in the UK, and with the development and implementation 
of monetarist critiques of government spending in the 1980s, and the collapse of the 
Soviet Communist Bloc in 1989, there has developed a severe crisis of confidence and 
legitimation with respect to the role of government itself, especially with regard to the 
provision of public services: Are they really needed? If so, could they be better and 
more efficiently provided by other mechanisms and stakeholders? What reasons are 
there for state intervention in the lives of ordinary citizens? Such questions underpin 
the development of neo-liberalism (Lemke 2012, Peters and Olson 2009) and can 
certainly be seen in the animus of critiques such as Coburn (2011). In this respect, 
government demand for “evidence” is as much a demand for material to justify its 
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own existence, as it is a demand for the evaluation of particular policy alternatives. 
What is at stake is the legitimacy and efficacy of policy intervention per se. 
Experimentalism: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? 
Advocates of experimental design have inserted themselves into this uncertain 
nexus. Given such uncertainty, it is understandable that governments and policy 
makers will look to research for assistance. Research, or more generally, ‘science’, is 
still largely regarded as independent of government and thus able, at least in principle, 
to provide disinterested evidence for both the development and evaluation of policy, 
despite recent moves toward the development of a closer and more utilitarian 
relationship. The attraction of the sort of evidence that Hargreaves (1996), Goldacre 
(2013) and Slavin (2002) claim can and should be provided is easy to appreciate. It 
sounds seductively simple. When charged with dispensing large amounts of public 
money for implementing programs and supporting research, one can understand that 
policy makers might value this sort of help—at least as long as the answers to the 
questions posed are clear and not too radical or expensive (Donmoyer 2012). 
 
But here’s the rub—the answers to questions of public policy and program 
evaluation are often not very clear (nor indeed are the questions sometimes). More 
circumspect proponents of experimental methods, specifically randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs), acknowledge that in order for a causal relationship to be established, 
even within the narrow terms of an RCT, very specific questions have to be asked. 
Thus, for example, Judith Gueron (2002) argues that while “random assignment . . . 
offers unique power in answering the ‘Does it make a difference?’ question” (p. 15), it 
is also the case that “[t]he key in large-scale projects is to answer a few questions 
well” (p. 40). In the same edited volume of papers, produced from a conference 
convened to promote “Randomized Trials in Education Research,” Thomas Cook and 
Monique Payne (2002) agree that 
most randomized experiments test the influence of only a small 
subset of potential causes of an outcome, and often only one. . . . 
even at their most comprehensive, experiments can responsibly test 
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only a modest number of the possible interactions between 
treatments. So, experiments are best when a causal question involves 
few variables [and] is sharply focused. (p. 152) 
What these observations mean is that RCTs can be very good at answering 
very specific questions and attributing cause in terms of statistical probability. What 
they cannot do is produce the questions in the first place: That depends on much prior, 
often qualitative, investigation, not to mention value judgments about what is 
significant in the qualitative data and what is the nature of the problem to be 
addressed by a particular program intervention. Nor can RCTs provide an explanation 
of why something has happened (i.e. the underlying causal mechanisms at work). 
That, likewise, will depend on much prior investigation and, if possible, parallel 
qualitative investigation of the phenomenon under study, to inform the development 
of a theory about what the researchers think may be happening. Thus RCTs, even 
within their own paradigmatic terms, are actually only one part of a much longer 
chain of necessary and integral research activities, as indicated below in Figure 1: 
Figure 1: Logic and Sequencing of RCT research design 
Initial 
exploratory 
research 
Possible 
explanations 
of 
phenomena: 
iteration of 
data and 
theory 
More 
focused 
pilot studies 
developing 
a specific 
intervention 
RCT Wider 
implementation 
and further 
refinement 
(assuming the 
RCT is 
successful; 
often it is not) 
Large scale 
dissemination 
and policy 
implementation 
 
Thus without a reasonable understanding of why particular outcomes have 
occurred, along with identifying the range of unintended consequences that will 
almost inevitably accompany an innovation, it is very difficult to generalize such 
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outcomes and implement the innovation with any degree of success elsewhere. A 
good example of such problems is provided by California’s attempt to implement 
smaller class sizes off the back of the apparent success of the Tennessee “STAR” 
evaluation. The Tennessee experiment worked with a sample, whereas California 
attempted statewide implementation, creating more problems than they solved by 
creating teacher shortages, especially in poorer neighborhoods in the state. There 
simply weren’t enough well-qualified teachers available to reduce class size 
statewide, and those that were tended to move to schools in richer neighborhoods 
when more jobs in such schools became available (see Grissmer, Subotnik, & Orland, 
2009). Interestingly, in this respect, Cook and Payne (2002) continue, 
The advantages of case study methods are considerable. . . . we value them as 
adjuncts to experiments. . . . Case study methods complement experiments 
when . . . it is not clear how successful program implementation will be, why 
implementation shortfalls may occur, what unexpected effects are likely to 
emerge, how respondents interpret the questions asked of them, [and] what the 
causal mediating processes are. . . . qualitative methods have a central role to 
play in experimental work. (p. 169) 
Similarly, in their more recent review of evaluating social programs, Schorr and 
Farrow (2011) note that: 
Leading public and philanthropic funders are constructing a framework for 
what is considered credible evidence…however we suggest that the 
boundaries which the prevailing framework draws round acceptable evidence 
too greatly limit the knowledge base available…Programs and practices that 
are proven through experimental methods are an important 
component…but…are best seen as a take off point rather than a destination…[ 
]…The problems that face us today tend to be caused by such complex forces 
that their course cannot be changed by isolated interventions…[ ]…too much 
potential for innovators and for improved outcomes will be lost if we continue 
to define credible evidence too narrowly (pp. iii, iv & vi). 
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One is tempted to ask, “So what’s all the fuss about?” Why is some RCT 
advocacy so strident and exclusive? Of course, different researchers will vary in the 
importance they give to qualitative methods, and it is both puzzling and irritating to 
have qualitative methods reduced to an “adjunct” or a “complement” to experimental 
approaches, or as some activity to be undertaken before the “real” scientific work 
begins (see Shavelson, Phillips, Towne, & Feuer, 2003, p. 28). But it does seem as 
though those whose work actually involves the conduct of social science experiments 
have a well-informed view of the strengths of qualitative research, along with clear 
understandings of the limitations of experiments, as opposed to those who just engage 
in uninformed criticism of qualitative methods and advocacy for RCTs. 
 
There is not enough space here to go into all the potential problems of 
conducting randomized experiments in the “natural” (as opposed to laboratory) setting 
of the school or the classroom. Extensive philosophical and practical critiques (and 
rejoinders) about the nature of causality and the place of RCTs in understanding 
social interaction and evaluating human services have been published by Erickson and 
Gutierrez (2002), Howe (2004), and Maxwell (2004, 2012), among many others. The 
debate goes back at least as far as Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) classic paper on 
‘Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research on Teaching’, and they 
in turn, acknowledge in their introduction McCall’s ‘How to Experiment in 
Education’, published in 1923. Current practitioners such as Gueron (2002) and Cook 
and Payne (2002), cited above, provide comprehensive accounts of the challenge of 
undertaking experiments “in the field.” The real problem with experimental methods, 
however, is that even if conducted as effectively as possible, they often don’t actually 
answer the “Does it make a difference?” question. Generating statistically significant 
results which, within the RCT paradigm are taken to ‘prove’ that an intervention 
works, is very difficult: 
Like a steady drip from a leaky faucet, the experimental studies being 
released this school year by the federal Institute of Education 
Sciences are mostly producing the same results: “No effects,” “No 
effects,” “No effects”. The disappointing yield is prompting 
researchers, product developers, and other experts to question the 
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design of the studies, whether the methodology they use is suited to 
the messy real world of education, and whether the projects are worth 
the cost, which has run as high as $14.4 million in the case of one 
such study. (Viadero, 2009, p. 1) 
It is interesting to review the ‘What Works Clearinghouse’ website with such 
issues in mind.  After 10 years and more of Federally mandated RCTs, does the 
Clearinghouse actually identify what works? The website is vast and a full review is 
beyond the scope of this paper, though that in itself is perhaps an indication of the 
unwieldy nature of much of the ‘evidence’ produced. Click on the What Works 
Clearinghouse website and the introductory copy states: 
 
We review the research on the different programs, products, practices, and 
policies in education. Then, by focusing on the results from high-quality 
research, we try to answer the question “What works in education?” Our 
goal is to provide educators with the information they need to make evidence-
based decisions. (http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/ accessed 22/10/14, original 
emphases) 
 
At the top of the page is a counter stating “10,498 studies reviewed” (and it does 
change – it stated “10,360 studies reviewed” when accessed two days previously – i.e. 
138 studies were additionally reviewed, or at least added to the website, in two days).  
 
Does any of this provide sound, informative and interesting information or 
“evidence”?  On the front page, under the banner headline “Find What Works”, key 
categories of substantive topics are listed. The first button is “improve literacy skills 
in 3rd graders”.  Click on this and you find:  “Results. 57 Interventions found “, with a 
complex filtering system to search the 57 results – not exactly user-friendly for a busy 
teacher or administrator. Of the first three studies visible in the partially open search 
window, all state their “effectiveness rating”, as “potentially positive effects”, but 
with the “extent of evidence” listed as “small”. Even this categorisation isn’t very 
transparent however, since the actual numbers of studies reviewed in each case varies, 
from 12 to 100. 
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The front page of the website also has a button for “Intervention Reports”. 
Click on this and 553 results appear (accessed 20/10/14 & 22/10/14, so it would 
appear that none of the additional 138 studies noted above were “Intervention 
Studies”). In total, of the first ten studies on this Intervention site,  
3 showed no evidence of effectiveness,  
3 showed mixed outcomes (some “potentially positive” evidence and some not) 
4 showed “potentially positive” evidence. No studies showed wholly “positive” 
results. 
“Potentially positive” is defined as: 
At least one study shows a statistically significant or substantively important 
positive effect, AND No studies show a statistically significant or 
substantively important negative effect AND fewer or the same number of 
studies show indeterminate effects than show statistically significant or 
substantively important positive effects.  
So no reports showed completely “positive” results and only four out of the first ten 
studies listed under “Intervention Reports” on the WWC website could report even 
“potentially positive” effects; and this rating could have been based on as little as one 
study. I could go on. Much of the material sampled is similarly ambiguous in its 
claims and limited in its usefulness. Of course this is not a representative sample of 
the whole WWC website and it is important not to treat the site unfairly; but equally it 
is perhaps not an untypical sample in-so-far-as it represents what a busy teacher or 
administrator might do in trying to find out what, does indeed, ‘work’. The site simply 
does not do this – it is far too complex and unwieldy, and most of the studies 
reviewed provide equivocal evidence at best. 
 
Of course it could be argued that it is important to know when something 
doesn’t work, as well as when it does, or where there is no evidence one way or 
another. This is how ‘normal science’ operates (Kuhn 1962): it takes time, usually 
progresses in very small incremental steps, and sometimes not at all. But this hardly 
matches up to the overblown rhetorical claims that current ‘evidence initiatives’ 
definitely identify what does work. My point is not that there is anything necessarily 
wrong with providing this sort of data base, but that it just doesn’t do what it says on 
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the tin – it doesn’t tell you, simply, easily, as promised, ‘what works’. Moreover the 
rhetoric privileges one form of research design and activity over others, and this 
would seem to be the real purpose. As Lather (2010) observes: 
I am not against the scientific study of education. My issue is how the 
narrowly defined sense of science-based evidence in this effort at the federal 
level works to discipline educational research. Calls for policy research that 
support neo-liberal governmental initiatives must be challenged for what they 
are: bad science for bad politics (p.37) 
 
Nor are such issues restricted to the WWC website.  The UK Cabinet Office issued a 
‘What Works’ summary document in November 2014 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/37803
8/What_works_evidence_for_decision_makers.pdf , accessed 09/02/15). The 
document summarises evidence from the government’s ‘What Works Network’ 
covering social policy issues including crime reduction and social care, as well as 
education.  The document claims it will lead to a “step-change...in government” (p.5) 
but actually provides similarly equivocal evidence when it comes to the specifics of 
intervention.  Thus for example one of the highlighted areas in Education states: 
Students in a class with a teaching assistant do not, on average...perform better 
than those with only a teacher. However...teaching assistants can have a 
positive impact if they are trained to support pupils...in well-structured 
interventions (p.13). 
This rather begs the question of how teaching assistants might be trained, by whom, 
for how long, and in what kinds of “well-structured interventions”. 
 
The Education evidence used in the UK Cabinet Office summary derives from 
the Education Endowment Foundation (EEF) website 
(http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/ ). The EEF is a charity set up by 
government to fund intervention studies in education. It links with an independent 
charity The Sutton Trust. The website includes a “Toolkit” which reviews 
interventions and rates them, similar to the What Works Clearinghouse. In its own 
words: 
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The Sutton Trust-EEF Teaching and Learning Toolkit is an accessible 
summary of educational research which provides guidance for teachers and 
schools on how to use their resources to improve the attainment of 
disadvantaged pupils. 
http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/toolkit/about-the-toolkit/  
accessed 09/02/15. 
The Toolkit rates each intervention by cost, evidence and impact, defined in terms of 
additional months of schooling that the intervention produces. One of the most 
effective interventions listed in the Toolkit in terms of impact is “Early years 
intervention”: 
early years and pre-school intervention is beneficial with above average levels 
of impact (a typical impact of six additional months' progress)... 
However, the Toolkit also reports that “Early years intervention” is very expensive 
and goes on to note that: 
In most studies, the impact on attainment tends to wear off over time...Early 
years and pre-school interventions are therefore not sufficient to close the gap 
in attainment for disadvantaged children...  
http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/toolkit/early-years-intervention/  
accessed 09/02/15 
Under a sub-heading ‘How secure is the evidence’ we are informed that: 
There are a number of systematic reviews and meta-analyses which have 
looked at the impact of early childhood intervention. Most of these are from 
the USA however...Evaluations of Sure Start in the UK do not show consistent 
positive effects 
 http://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/toolkit/early-years-intervention/  
accessed 09/02/15 
So once again, even apparently strong evidence of ‘what works’ is hedged around 
with caveats, and begs many questions about the detail of the interventions. 
 
Two other sites similar to the What Works Clearinghouse exist in the UK, 
based at the Institute for Effective Education (IEE) at the University of York and the 
Centre for Effective Education (CEE) at Queen’s University, Belfast. IEE’s inaugural 
director was Robert Slavin and he is still listed on its website as a current member of 
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staff. The IEE website lists 15 pages of ‘intervention programs’ with evidence ratings, 
a total of 90 programs in all. They are rated by the allocation of red dots – three dots 
(“proven”), two dots (“moderate”), one dot (“limited”) and no dots. Only the first 
seven entries out of ninety score three dots (proven), with the next 11 studies 
categorised as two dots (moderate evidence), and the next 3 as one dot (limited 
evidence).  The remaining 69 studies are categorised as “not evaluated”. 
(http://www.evidence4impact.org.uk/programmes.php#search_results accessed 
10/10/14). So, to reiterate, only seven out of ninety studies (7/90) are rated as 
“proven”. The rating system defines “proven” as “has been shown to work in multiple 
well-controlled studies. This intervention has a good chance of improving your pupils' 
outcomes if it is implemented as designed”. Yet again, this rather begs the question of 
what is meant by “a good chance” and how the intervention could indeed be 
“implemented as designed”. Other evidence, of how to implement the intervention, 
and what the practical problems might be, is clearly needed. 
 
The Centre for Effective Education website claims that it is “Transforming 
Education Through Evidence. Education for transformation” 
(http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/CentreforEffectiveEducation/#  accessed 
11/10/14). Unlike WWC and IEE the Centre does not list large numbers of reviewed 
studies, but reports its own studies. Under “Current Projects” the website states: “The 
Centre for Effective Education has an impressive portfolio of research projects; 
currently running 10 major studies, of which 6 are randomised controlled trials”. 
However, of those projects listed under ‘Current Projects…Randomised Controlled 
Trials’, no reports are available, including from 4 projects which ostensibly finished 
in 2012. Of those listed under “Completed Projects…Randomised Controlled Trials” 
the most recently completed (in 2013) is “The DELTA Parenting Programme 
Evaluation: DELTA evaluation a randomised controlled trial”. The findings are 
summarised as: 
  
Overall this randomised controlled trial showed that parents who took part in 
the Early Years DELTA parenting programme reported increased feelings of 
confidence (parental efficacy), specifically in relation to three of the nine 
outcome areas measured, namely parents’ confidence in: their knowledge of 
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their child’s development and needs; their self-acceptance as a good parent, 
and; disciplining and setting boundaries for their child... This trial provided no 
evidence of change in the remaining outcome areas (p.6)  
http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-
centres/CentreforEffectiveEducation/Filestore/Filetoupload,421854,en.pdf 
(accessed 11/10/14) 
 
Thus even an apparently positive study indicates that the intervention made no 
positive difference to six out of nine of the intended outcomes. The study also notes 
that use of local libraries was impacted negatively.  The report includes extensive 
discussion of the limitations of the study, among them being that the measures used 
involved parents of young children self-reporting through completing questionnaires 
as to whether or not they felt “increased feelings of confidence” and so forth. What 
difference the intervention made to the actual way in which parents interacted with 
their children would have required a different (more qualitative, observation-based) 
research design. The report is to be commended for being appropriately cautious 
about what it can claim, but equally the claimed ‘gold standard’ legitimacy of an RCT 
is largely illusory. 
 
Similar observations can be made about other reports on the CEE website. 
They read like many publically available technical research reports produced by many 
scholars over many years - basically saying ‘trust us, we’re the experts, we’ve done 
the stats’; classic ‘scientistic-style’ reporting. Overall there is nothing wrong with 
these reports – they are unremarkable evaluation reports that any competent university 
department or commercial consultancy could have produced. But this, of course, is 
the point – they are unremarkable. They cannot be said to be “Transforming 
Education through Evidence” so one has to wonder about why there is so much focus 
on RCTs, why now, and why they are surrounded by all the self-promotional rhetoric? 
I have, of course, answered my own question with this last observation – what we are 
talking about here are not arguments about ‘better’ or ‘worse’ approaches to research 
design, but rather ways of positioning oneself in the market place of competitive 
research bidding. It is also interesting to note that a very significant focus of many of 
the prominent studies across all these websites seems to involve early years 
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interventions of various kinds – changing disruptive behavior, improving parenting 
skills, improving early literacy and numeracy, and so forth. One is moved to wonder 
why might this be – it is a relatively small aspect of what we might include in any 
overall definition of ‘education’, albeit an important one; and can such studies really 
tell us any more than we already know from many years of both qualitative and 
quantitative research on early years education? Poverty is the issue in this context, 
rather than, or at least in addition to, the effectiveness of early years education.  
An important issue here is the difference between ‘research’ and ‘evaluation’. 
RCTs can provide some limited evidence in relation to specific programs and 
interventions, but it is puzzling as to how such an approach to evaluation has come to 
dominate policy discussions of ‘research’ per se. We should not, however, be 
surprised that the evidence produced by RCTs is so equivocal. Campbell and Stanley 
(1963) noted that there have been regular periods of RCT advocacy and RCT 
disillusionment in educational research as the clear cut results that RCTs promise 
have been unforthcoming. It was precisely the confounding problems of diverse 
implementation and interaction effects that produced so many “no significant 
difference” results in the 1960s in the context of curriculum evaluation studies. 
Reflections on such results prompted the development and use of qualitative methods 
in evaluation studies in the first place, in the1970s and 1980s (Cronbach, 1975; 
Cronbach & Associates, 1980; Guba & Lincoln 1981, 1989; Hamilton, Jenkins, King, 
MacDonald, & Parlett, 1976; Stake, 1967, 1978; Stenhouse, 1975; Stenhouse, Verma, 
Wild, & Nixon, 1982).  Indeed, in one mixed method study of the “problems and 
effects of teaching about race relations” (as issues of race were called in the UK in 
those days), it was reported that 60% of the sample student population became less 
racially prejudiced as measured by attitude tests after following a particular program, 
but 40% became more prejudiced. As the author himself mused, what on earth is one 
supposed to do with such a result (Stenhouse et al., 1982)?  
It is interesting in this respect to note that Schorr and Farrow (2011), in 
addition to arguing that complex social problems cannot be changed by one-off 
“isolated interventions” (p. iv) however well evaluated, also call for “more 
responsive, sensitive and cost effective ways of learning in real time…” (p.2). It was 
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Bob Stake, of course, as far back as 1973 who called for the development of 
“responsive evaluation”: 
To be of service and to emphasize evaluation issues that are important for each 
particular program, I recommend the responsive evaluation approach. It is an 
approach that sacrifices some precision in measurement, hopefully to increase 
the usefulness of the findings to persons in and around the 
program...Responsive evaluation is based on what people do naturally to 
evaluate things: they observe and react...An educational evaluation is 
responsive evaluation (1) if it orients more directly to program activities than 
to program intents, (2) if it responds to audience requirements for information, 
and (3) if the different value-perspectives of the people at hand are referred to 
in reporting the success and failure of the program.  (Stake 1973, pp 4-5) 
Beyond Single Studies: Systematic Reviewing 
One response of those interested in unpacking the problems with RCTs 
highlighted above would probably be to conduct further detailed investigation of the 
program as implemented, using a range of other methods. I shall return to the issue of 
mixed methods research designs below. However, a different approach has been 
advanced by those committed to experimental design but who acknowledge the 
potential weakness of relying on single studies—that of so-called ‘systematic 
reviewing’. Advocates of systematic reviewing argue that evidence to inform policy 
should be accumulated across studies, but not just any studies, rather, only those that 
pass strict tests of quality. And those tests of quality have until relatively recently 
involved focusing on large-scale samples and, ideally, experimental designs (Gough 
& Elbourne, 2002; Oakley 2000, 2003). The case for developing systematic reviewing 
is based on transparency of process and clear criteria for including and excluding 
studies from the review. The case derives from critiques of so-called ‘narrative 
reviewing’, which, it is claimed, focuses on summarizing findings, in relation to a 
particular argument, rather than reviewing the whole field dispassionately and 
“systematically” so that the reader can be confident that all relevant prior knowledge 
in a field has been included and summarized. Arguments in favor of conducting such 
reviews reflect the critiques of social and educational research outlined earlier: that 
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the findings of empirical studies are often too small-scale, non-cumulative, or 
contradictory to be useful. Advocates are closely associated with the Cochrane 
Collaboration in medical and health care research and the Campbell Collaboration in 
social science, both of which favor the accumulation and dissemination of research 
findings based on scientific methods, particularly randomized controlled trials. As 
such, systematic reviewing is very much located within the international “evidence-
based policy and practice” movement (Davies, 2004; Davies & Boruch, 2001; see also 
Mosteller & Boruch, 2002, p. 2, for evidence of the close networking of this 
international movement). 
 
The original criteria of quality employed by systematic reviewing clearly 
derived from the medical model, but it is interesting to note that even as some 
researchers continue to argue the relevance of an RCT-based medical model to 
educational and social research, it has been criticized as inadequate in the field of 
medicine itself. Medical researchers understand that many issues of patient treatment 
and care require the design of qualitative as well as quantitative studies, in order to 
understand the ways in which patients respond to diagnosis and treatment, and 
substantial developments have tried to find ways of integrating the findings of 
qualitative studies into systematic reviews (e.g., Barbour & Barbour, 2003; Dixon-
Woods, Booth, & Sutton, 2007; Dixon-Woods, Fitzpatrick, & Roberts, 2001). As 
Major and Savin-Baden (2011) note: “myriad approaches to the synthesis of 
qualitative research have now arisen” in the “health and medical professions” (p. 
646). Such developments indicate that qualitative data is appreciated as important in 
understanding the conduct and impact of medical processes and interventions. 
 
The original “hard line” position of systematic reviewing in social research 
has been significantly modified, as it has encountered considerable skepticism over 
the last several years (Hammersley, 2001; MacLure; 2005; cf. also Oakley’s 2006 
response, and Hammersley’s 2008 rejoinder). Different kinds of research findings, 
including those of qualitative research, are now routinely included in such reviews, 
though with caveats about the quality of evidence deployed. Attempts have also been 
made to appraise the quality and thus the “warrant” of individual qualitative research 
studies and their findings before inclusion However, this can lead toward absurdity 
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rather than serious synthesis as the complexity of qualitative work is rendered into an 
amenable form for instant appraisal. Thus, for example, Attree and Milton (2006) 
report on a “Quality Appraisal Checklist . . . [and its associated] quality scoring 
system . . . [for] “the quality appraisal of qualitative research” (p. 125). Studies are 
scored on a 4-point scale: 
A No or few flaws 
B Some flaws 
C Considerable flaws, study still of some value 
D Significant flaws that threaten the validity of the whole study (p. 125) 
Only studies rated A or B were included in the systematic reviews that the authors 
conducted, and in the paper they attempt to exemplify how these categories are 
operationalized in their work. But their descriptions beg many more questions than 
they answer. The above scale simply provides a reductionist checklist of mediocrity. 
Even the most stunning and insightful piece of qualitative work can only be 
categorized as having “No or few flaws”. The point about qualitative research of 
course, is that its persuasiveness depends on its insight, not adherence to a particular 
approach to fieldwork or analysis. And this is precisely the point at issue with respect 
to using research to inform policy: Standards and checklists cannot substitute for 
informed judgment when it comes to balancing the rigor of the research against its 
potential contribution to policy. This is a matter of judgment, both for researchers and 
for policy makers. 
 
Systematic reviewing is also very expensive and inefficient in terms of time 
and material resources, given the little it often delivers in terms of actual ‘findings’. 
This is a problem it shares with the conduct of individual RCTs of course. The results 
of systematic reviews can take many months to appear, and policy makers are as 
likely to ask for very rapid reviews of research to be conducted over a few days or 
weeks, and possibly assembled via an expert seminar, as to commission longer-term 
systematic reviews (Boaz, Solesbury, & Sullivan, 2004, 2007). However, the more 
general issue for this chapter is the impact of the ‘scientific evidence movement’ on 
qualitative research, and the above checklist produced by Attree and Milton (2006) 
well illustrates the contortions that some qualitative researchers are prepared to go 
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through in order to maintain the visibility of their work in the context of this 
movement. 
Impact on Qualitative Research: Setting Standards to Control Quality? 
Another major response to the evidence movement has been for organizations 
and associations to start trying to “set standards” in qualitative research, and indeed in 
educational research more generally, to reassure policy makers about the quality of 
qualitative research and to reassert the contribution that qualitative research can (and 
should) make to government-funded programs. However, the field of qualitative 
research, or qualitative inquiry, is very broad, involving large numbers of researchers 
working in different countries, working in and across many different disciplines 
(anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.), different applied research and policy 
settings (education, social work, health studies, etc.), and different national 
environments with their different policy processes and socioeconomic context of 
action. It is not at all self-evident that reaching agreement across such boundaries is 
desirable, even if it were possible. Different disciplines and contexts of action produce 
different readings and interpretations of apparently common literatures and similar 
issues. It is the juxtaposition of these readings, the comparing and contrasting within 
and across boundaries that allows us to learn about them and reflect on our own 
situated understandings of our own contexts. Multiplicity of approach and 
interpretation, and multivocalism of reading and response, are the basis of quality in 
the qualitative research community and, it might be argued, in the advancement of 
science more generally. The key issue is to discuss and explore quality across 
boundaries, thereby continually to develop it, not fix it, as at best a good recipe and at 
worst a narrow training manual. 
 
Nevertheless, various attempts at “setting standards” are now being made, 
often, it seems, with the justification of “doing it to ourselves, before others do it to 
us” (Cheek, 2007; see also the discussion by Moss et al., 2009). In England, 
independent academics based at the National Centre for Social Research (a not-for-
profit consultancy organization) were commissioned by the Strategy Unit of the UK 
government Cabinet Office to produce a report on “Quality in Qualitative Evaluation: 
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A Framework for Assessing Research Evidence” (Cabinet Office, 2003a). The 
rationale seems to have been that UK government departments are commissioning 
policy evaluations in the context of the move toward evidence-informed policy and 
practice and that guidelines for judging the quality of qualitative approaches and 
methods were considered to be necessary. The report was produced under a different 
government and before the latest renewed focus on experimental design in the UK 
(Goldacre 2013, discussed above). Nevertheless it provides an interesting insight into 
what constitutes officially sanctioned qualitative research. 
 
The framework is a guide for the commissioners of research when drawing up 
tender documents and reading reports, but it is also meant to influence the conduct 
and management of research and the training of social researchers (Cabinet Office, 
2003a, p. 6). However, the summary “Quality Framework” begs many questions, 
while the full report reads like an introductory text on qualitative research methods. 
Paradigms are described and issues rehearsed, but all are resolved in a bloodless, 
technical, and strangely old-fashioned counsel of perfection. The reality of doing 
qualitative research and indeed of conducting evaluation, with all the contingencies, 
political pressures, and decisions that have to be made, is completely absent. The 
implication is that one would have to comply with everything in the framework in 
order for one’s work to be regarded as high quality. The issues which are highlighted 
are indeed important for social researchers to take into account in the design, conduct, 
and reporting of research studies. However, simply listed as issues to be addressed, 
they comprise a banal and inoperable set of standards that beg all the important 
questions of conducting and writing up qualitative fieldwork. Everything cannot be 
done; choices have to be made: How are they to be made, and how are they to be 
justified? 
 
To be more positive for a moment, and note the arguments that might be put 
forward in favor of setting standards, it could be argued that if qualitative social and 
educational research is going to be commissioned, then a set of standards that can act 
as a bulwark against commissioning inadequate or underfunded studies in the first 
place ought to be welcomed. It might also be argued that this document at least 
demonstrates that qualitative research was being taken seriously enough within 
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government at that time to warrant a guidebook being produced for civil servants. The 
Framework might be said to confer legitimacy on civil servants who still want to 
commission qualitative work in the face of the policy move to RCTs; on qualitative 
social researchers bidding for such work; and indeed on social researchers more 
generally, who may have to deal with local research ethics committees (RECs; IRBs 
in the USA), which are predisposed toward a more quantitative natural science model 
of investigation. But should we really welcome such “legitimacy”? The dangers on 
the other side of the argument, as to whether social scientists need or should accede to 
criteria of quality endorsed by the state, are legion. In this respect, it is not at all clear 
that, in principle, state endorsement of qualitative research is any more desirable than 
state endorsement of RCTs. 
 
Similar guidelines and checklists have appeared in the USA. Ragin, Nagel, 
and White (2004) report on a “Workshop on Scientific Foundations of Qualitative 
Research,” conducted under the auspices of the National Science Foundation and with 
the intention of placing “qualitative and quantitative research on a more equal 
footing . . . in funding agencies and graduate training programs” (p. 9). The report 
argues for the importance of qualitative research and thus advocates funding 
qualitative research per se, but equally, by articulating the “scientific foundations” it 
is arguing for the commissioning of not just qualitative research, but a particular form 
of qualitative research. Moreover when it comes to the basic logic of qualitative work, 
Ragin et al. (2004) do not get much further than arguing for a supplementary role for 
qualitative methods: 
Causal mechanisms are rarely visible in conventional quantitative research . . . 
they must be inferred. Qualitative methods can be helpful in assessing the 
credibility of these inferred mechanisms. (p. 15) 
Ragin et al. (2004) also conclude with another counsel of perfection: 
These guidelines amount to a specification of the ideal qualitative research 
proposal. A strong proposal should include as many of these elements as 
feasible. (p. 17, emphasis original) 
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But again, that’s the point: What is feasible (and relevant to the particular 
investigation) is what is important, not what is ideal. How are such crucial choices to 
be made? Once again, “guidelines” and “recommendations” end up as no guide at all; 
rather, they are a hostage to fortune whereby virtually any qualitative proposal or 
report could be found wanting. 
 
A potentially much more significant example of this tendency is the American 
Educational Research Association (AERA) “Standards for Reporting on Empirical 
Social Science Research in AERA Publications” (AERA, 2006). The Standards 
comprise eight closely typed double-column pages and include “eight general areas” 
(p. 33) of advice, each of which is subdivided into a total of 40 subsections, some of 
which are subdivided still further. Yet only one makes any mention of the fact that 
research findings should be interesting or novel or significant, and that is the briefest 
of references under “Problem Formulation,” which we are told should answer the 
question of “why the results of the investigation would be of interest to the research 
community” (p. 34). Intriguingly, whether the results might be of interest to the policy 
community is not mentioned as a criterion of quality.  
As is typical of the genre, the Standards include an opening disclaimer that: 
The acceptability of a research report does not rest on evidence of literal 
satisfaction of every standard. . . . In a given case there may be a sound 
professional reason why a particular standard is inapplicable. (p. 33) 
But once again, this merely restates the problem rather than resolves it. The Standards 
may be of help in the context of producing a book-length thesis or dissertation, but no 
5,000-word journal article could meet them all. Equally, however, even supposing 
that they could all be met, the article might still not be worth reading. It would be 
“warranted” and “transparent,” which are the two essential standards highlighted in 
the preamble (p. 33), but it could still be boring and unimportant. 
 
It is also interesting to note that words such as warrant and transparency raise 
issues of trust. They imply a concern for the very existence of a substantial data set as 
well as how it might be used to underpin conclusions drawn. Yet the issue of trust is 
only mentioned explicitly once, in the section of the Standards dealing with 
“qualitative methods”: “It is the researcher’s responsibility to show the reader that the 
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report can be trusted” (AERA, 2006, p. 38). No such injunction appears in the parallel 
section on “quantitative methods” (p. 37); in fact, the only four uses of the actual 
word warrant in the whole document all occur in the section on “qualitative methods” 
(p. 38). The implication seems to be that quantitative methods really are trusted—the 
issue doesn’t have to be raised—whereas qualitative methods are not. Standards of 
probity are only of concern when qualitative approaches are involved. 
 
Mixed Methods Research 
A further response to current debate has been the development, or, perhaps more 
accurately, the rediscovery and redevelopment of mixed methods research. Mixing 
methods in social research and program evaluation has a long history.  The argument 
has been that no single method could afford a complete purchase on the topic under 
study (Bryman, 1988: Denzin, 1970). Evaluations have routinely employed a range of 
methods to investigate the site-based specifics of program interpretation and adoption, 
alongside more general surveys of implementation and outcomes across sites (Greene, 
et.al. 1989). However over the last ten years or so, the ‘Field’ of ‘Mixed Methods 
Research’ (MMR) has increasingly been exerting itself as something separate, novel, 
and significant, such that proponents such as Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) claim: 
“Mixed methods research has evolved to the point where it is a separate 
methodological orientation with its own worldview vocabulary and techniques” (p. x). 
Johnson et.al (2007) argue that “Mixed methods research…is becoming 
increasingly…recognised as the third major research approach or research 
paradigm…” (pp. 112, original emphasis).  
 
More recently, as such views have been challenged, interrogated and 
augmented, the arguments have been modified. The claim to a distinct third paradigm 
is left open, not least because other MMR advocates have criticised the whole notion 
of paradigms somehow driving and determining research methods and have argued 
instead for a more grounded and pragmatic approach to understanding what 
researchers actually do, and how different approaches are actually combined in action 
(Christ 2009, Greene 2008, Harrits 2011, Morgan 2007, Tashakkori & Teddlie 2010). 
In addition to debates about mixed methods per se, it is also the case that mixed 
methods research has been alighted upon as a way to engage and modify the debate 
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about RCTs, and embed qualitative research in larger scale mixed methods studies. 
Thus for example Mason (2006) argues for qualitative methods to “drive” mixed 
methods research; Hesse-Biber (2010a,b) and Mertens (2007, 2010) argue for the use 
of qualitative methods to advance social justice issues in large scale investigations, 
and to enhance the “credibility” of RCTs (Hesse-Biber 2012).  
 
The problem however, noted by many in the field (e.g. Hesse-Biber 2010a), is 
that qualitative research is too often allocated a subservient role in mixed method 
designs and also that the language of pragmatism (e.g. Morgan 2007, 2014) can shade 
into the treatment of research design as simply a technical matter, without reference to 
purpose, values or social justice. In this respect it does seem that ‘Mixed Methods 
Research’ (capital ‘M’, capital ‘M’, capital ‘R’) is being presented as a new and better 
form of science; a more complex approach to research designed to address the more 
complex problems that social research now faces (Caracelli, 2006; Creswell, et. al. 
2011, Schorr and Farrow 2011). Whether such a position really benefits the 
development of qualitative research is a moot point. The subservience of qualitative 
methods would appear to be a particular issue in the context of government-sponsored 
evaluation studies, when arguing for the inclusion of qualitative methods is often 
predicated on what detail it can supply to flesh out the bones of a survey or an 
experiment in the context of a demand for empirical evidence of ‘what works’. Thus 
for example, Valerie Caracelli (2006) in an article written from the perspective of the 
US Government Accountability Office reports several such instances. She argues for 
the inclusion of qualitative methods alongside the use of surveys and randomised 
controlled field trials “to assure contextual understanding” (p. 84).  She states that: 
“Recently, there has been an acknowledgement about how ethnographic studies can 
inform agency actions and how it can be used to study culture in organisations” 
(p.87). Similarly in the UK Cabinet Office report reviewed above (Cabinet Office 
2003b), one of the key quotes in the report used to justify the use of qualitative 
methods comes not from the epistemological or methodological literature, but from a 
civil servant, a government department “research manager”: 
I often commission qualitative research when it's about users or stakeholders 
and . . . I want to understand . . . how a user is likely to respond. . . . I want to 
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know how they see the world…it's a wonderful vehicle . . . if you want to 
understand the motives of people. (Cabinet Office, 2003b, p. 34). 
So agencies and policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic value qualitative research 
for the insight it can provide into the “culture” of organisations and the “motives” of 
the people who work in them. It can certainly be argued that policy and its evaluation 
will benefit from being grounded in such data, but it is equally the case that such 
evidence could be used to monitor compliance with policy rather than to evaluate it. 
Qualitative data could even be used to allocate blame to individuals at the local level 
if implementation is found to be ineffective, rather than critique policy or 
dissemination strategies. Evaluation requires that policy and policymakers are 
themselves also rendered subject to scrutiny, not that (qualitative) social research 
methods are simply used to provide data for government. 
Capacity Building, Professionalization, and the Retreat Into ‘Science’ 
One response to the defining of standards and guidelines and the development 
of larger scale mixed methods research designs is simply to accept them at face value. 
In many respects they are unremarkable, very much ‘business as usual’ in the long 
history of social and educational research. And yet such documents, and renewed calls 
for mixed methods research, carry more import in current circumstances —they also 
legitimate a particular delineation and control of the discourse surrounding qualitative 
research. In so doing, and in combination with other interventions such as the 
increasing reach of ethics committees and government regulation of research activity 
(Department of Health, 2005; Lincoln & Tierney, 2004; Torrance, 2006), they are 
beginning to change the very social relations of research and the ways in which issues 
of research quality have hitherto been addressed. Pursuing and developing quality in 
qualitative research has always involved reading key sources iteratively and critically, 
in the context of designing and conducting a study, and discussing the implications 
and consequences with doctoral supervisors, or colleagues or project advisory groups. 
Setting standards in qualitative research, however, is a different enterprise. It implies 
the identification of universally appropriate and applicable procedures, which in turn 
involves documentary and institutional realization and compliance. 
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These developments are taking place in the context of moves towards what we 
might term ‘big social science’ – the concentration of research resources on large 
scale inter-disciplinary and inter-institutional programs of research. Governments 
around the world are seeking better value for money from their investment in research 
and this has involved restricting and focusing resource allocation. Governments, 
funding agencies and individual universities are now concentrating resources on fewer 
research units and programs, and are taking decisions to develop a 'big science' model 
of social science. This is being pursued by funders supporting fewer, larger projects, 
with explicit policy encouragement for researchers to develop cross-institutional, 
mixed method approaches, to address the supposedly 'big issues' of our time: health 
and well being, an aging population, sustainable growth, and so forth.  These issues 
are indeed important, and research evidence should be produced to interrogate and 
inform public debate.  But such issues are being presented as part of a common-sense, 
taken-for-granted trade-off of government funding in exchange for social scientists 
serving policy. Critique, diversity of perspective, and the insight into complexity 
which detailed qualitative studies can provide are potentially being marginalized. 
Social science is being reconceptualised as a technical service to government rather 
than developed as a democratic intellectual resource for the community.   
   
Much of the activity associated with such moves goes under the heading of 
“capacity building,” certainly in the UK. As the government seeks to concentrate 
research resources in a smaller number of universities and extract maximum 
economic and social value from them, “centers of excellence” are being promoted, 
along with a concomitant obligation for these centers to link with and train in standard 
procedures those left stranded outside them (Department for Business, Innovations, 
and Skills, 2009; ESRC, 2009a, 2009b, 2015; National Centre for Research Methods, 
n.d.; Torrance, 2014, 2015). Similar aspirations also seem to be emerging in the USA 
(Eisenhart & De Haan, 2005; NRC, 2005; Walters, Lareau and Ranis 2009). It seems, 
then, that what is going on here is a struggle over the political future and bureaucratic 
institutionalization of social research. What we are witnessing is a crucial moment in 
the continuing professionalization of social research. Governments are looking to 
control and quality-assure the process of social research and in so doing are treating 
researchers as an almost directly employed category of government worker in the 
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“nationalized industry” of knowledge production for the knowledge economy. 
Concentration of research resources, coupled with large-scale collaborative programs 
of research projects, provides the context for and link into networked programs of 
capacity building and professional development for researchers. This provides a 
context for the development of a cadre of professional social researchers, oriented to 
funded policy priorities, and outside of or certainly additional to what might be 
termed the traditional scholarly route of disciplinary PhDs and individual 
monographs. The production of new textbooks in long-standing, but newly prominent 
fields such as Mixed Methods Research might be said to be a manifestation of the 
same phenomenon (e.g. Tashakorri and Teddlie 2003, 2010).  What was once an 
ordinary approach to research design, has become a major intervention in the training 
of social researchers. 
 
This in turn provides threats and opportunities for researchers as they seek to 
position themselves as both independent and autonomous sources of disinterested 
(i.e., scientific) advice, but nevertheless trustworthy professionals who can be relied 
upon to focus on topics of interest to policy and deliver a high-quality product. Thus, 
some researchers are attempting to respond to the pressure of policy and the evidence 
movement by producing defensive documents that emphasize the need for 
professional standards and self regulation (i.e., the AERA Standards above). In so 
doing, they implicitly accept the charges leveled against them. As Rizvi and Lingard 
(2010, p. 6) observe: “Policies...proffer solutions to the problem constructed by the 
policy itself”. Such responses also appeal to and attempt to reassert the independence 
of “science” and the scientific community as a self-regulating group which, while 
broadly inclusive, nevertheless has clear boundaries and not only can define and 
protect standards, but will.  
 
Other researchers are seeing opportunities to redefine the field and their place 
within it (i.e., their status and access to research funding). This is similarly being 
pursued by an appeal to science, but it involves a much more exclusive and narrow 
interpretation of science—defined by method (RCTs and systematic reviews) rather 
than broad approach. However, this latter group seems increasingly out of step with 
government demands for utility. One-off interventions studies do not address the 
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issues of large-scale inter-disciplinary approaches to complex social problems; and in 
any case too many such studies simply show “no effects” or only “potentially 
positive” effects. They are also expensive, as are systematic reviews, and hardly 
represent value-for-money. Thus it would appear that such researchers are deploying 
the rhetoric of science as part of a competitive struggle with other researchers for 
resources, rather than in any direct response to the supposed needs of government. 
 
Despite the current policy commitment to RCTs, continued funding for such a 
narrow version of science seems unlikely if results are not more useful.  The irony 
here is that despite repeated calls to make educational and social research more like 
medical research, social policy research demands much quicker results and truncated 
timescales. ‘Normal science’ takes time. It progresses very slowly by the 
accumulation of many routine and piecemeal studies. RCTs in medicine constitute 
part of this routine. It is taken for granted that new therapies could well take 15-20 
years to move from initial laboratory observations to ‘proven’ available treatments (cf 
Balas and Boren 2000). It could similarly be argued in education that many years of  
“no effects” RCTs will be required before a sound knowledge base of what does 
indeed ‘work’ can be produced. However social systems, including education 
systems, are dynamic and change over time – they cannot be held constant while the 
problems of today are finally solved 20 years hence. The problems, and our 
interpretations and understandings of them, will have long since morphed and 
changed and research activity must engage with this changing context. Social research 
and social policy are in an iterative relationship not a linear one. 
Science Is Not Enough: Toward a Different Approach 
Interestingly, just as we’ve been here before with respect to 1960s/1970s 
disillusionment with research results that regularly showed “no significant 
difference,” so we’ve been here before with respect to the response of the research 
community. Barry MacDonald (1974/1987) identified similar tensions over what role 
the research community should play in evaluating educational innovations. He 
identified three ideal types of approaches to evaluation—autocratic, bureaucratic, 
and democratic, aligning autocratic evaluation with scientific research, bureaucratic 
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evaluation with technical collaboration, and democratic evaluation with providing 
information for the widest possible public audience in real time: 
Autocratic evaluation is a conditional service to . . . government. . . . It offers 
external validation of policy in exchange for compliance with its 
recommendations. . . . the evaluator . . . acts as expert adviser. . .  
Bureaucratic evaluation is an unconditional service to . . . government. . . . The 
evaluator . . . acts as a management consultant [and] the report is owned by the 
bureaucracy and lodged in its files. . . . Democratic evaluation is an 
information service to the whole community about the characteristics of an 
educational program. . . . The democratic evaluator recognises value pluralism 
and seeks to represent a range of interests. . . . techniques of data gathering 
and presentation must be accessible to non-specialist audiences. (pp. 44–45) 
MacDonald (1974/1987) also argued that evaluation reports should not simply be 
technically competent scientific documents but rather: “The criterion of success is the 
range of audiences served. The report aspires to ‘best seller’ status” (p. 45). 
Of course, times change and the parallels with current debates are not exact. In 
particular, the obviously favored stance of “democratic evaluation” still presupposes 
that data can be gathered and interests represented in a fairly straightforward, realist 
fashion. Such aspirations would be more complex to accomplish now. Yet such a 
formulation also resonates with contemporary issues around stakeholder involvement, 
voice, and the engagement of a wider community in deciding which research 
questions are important to ask and how best to try to answer them. It is now widely 
recognized from many different perspectives, including that of the empowerment of 
research subjects on the one hand, and policy relevance and social utility on the other, 
that an assumption of scientific disinterest and independence is no longer sustainable. 
Other voices must be heard in the debate over scientific quality and merit, particularly 
in an applied, policy-oriented field such as education. Thus, for example, Gibbons el 
al. (1994) distinguish between what they term Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge, with 
Mode 1 knowledge deriving from what might be termed the traditional academic 
disciplines, and Mode 2 knowledge deriving from and operating within “a context of 
application”: 
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[I]n Mode 1 problems are set and solved in a context governed by 
the, largely academic, interests of a specific community. By contrast, 
Mode 2 knowledge is carried out in a context of application. (p. 3) 
Such knowledge is “transdisciplinary . . . [and] involves the close interaction of many 
actors throughout the process of knowledge production” (p. vii). In turn, quality must 
be “determined by a wider set of criteria which reflects the broadening social 
composition of the review system” (p. 8). 
 
The language employed by Gibbons et al. (1994) and the assumed context of 
operation very much reflect an engineering/technology-transfer type set of activities, 
but they also mirror a far wider set of concerns with respect to redefining the validity 
and social utility of research. There is a clear orientation toward the co-creation of 
knowledge through collaborative problem-solving action—rather than the discovery 
of knowledge through centralized, “expert” experimental investigation, which then 
gets disseminated to “practitioners” at the periphery. Ideas about the co-creation of 
knowledge link with deliberative and empowerment models of evaluation (Fetterman, 
2001; House & Howe, 1999), which in turn owe something to MacDonald’s 
(1974/1987) original notion of “democratic evaluation” (explicitly so, in House & 
Howe’s case). The concept of “Mode 2 knowledge” also reflects something of the 
arguments around indigenous knowledge (Smith, 2005) produced in situ for local use, 
and the many articulations and interrogations of how to identify and represent 
different “voices” in research (e.g., Alcoff, 1991; Fielding, 2004; Goodley, 1999; 
Jackson & Mazzei, 2009; Shahjahan 2011). Such arguments, coalescing into a 
diverse, contested, but nevertheless highly provocative and promising constellation of 
issues around the validity, utility, and ethics of social research, also bring us to the 
very limit of what it is currently possible to think about the relationship of qualitative 
inquiry to science, policy, and democracy. The challenge we face is how to sustain the 
tension between interrogating and reconceptualizing problems—“thinking the new”—
while also addressing the “here and now” of the enduring social and political issues 
that face our society (see Lather, 2004, 2010). The issue is how to reconcile the 
(research) need to investigate and comprehend complexity with the (policy) urge to 
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simplify and act. To invert Marx, policy makers seek to change the world, but first 
they need to try to understand it, while involving others in both processes. 
 
Social research faces profound challenges at the present time as decades of 
empirical research, stretching back to the Chicago School of the 1930s and indeed 
beyond, repeatedly rediscover social problems and re-describe them in contemporary 
terms, rather than solve them. Policy looks to social research for advice, even ‘proof’, 
but it cannot be provided in the form that is being sought. The current policy 
consensus seems to be that we need large scale concentrations of research power, 
involving multi-institutional and multi-disciplinary investigations of the major issues 
of our time: community poverty and early family intervention; health and well-being; 
globalised security, and so forth, underpinned by experimental design to identify 
which interventions will work best to change human behavior. As neo-liberal 
capitalism (re)creates the problems, governments and, increasingly, large scale 
philanthropic organizations which have been produced in the context of neo-
liberalism, are trying to address them by squeezing more and more out of essentially 
the same model of social research as has been available for nearly a century. 
Meanwhile researchers in turn seek to protect and enlarge their funding sources and 
position themselves better in relation to the increasingly competitive funding 
environment.  These are the circumstances in which social research now operates and 
it may be that larger scale collaborations are indeed required and inevitable. But 
equally the values and processes of qualitative research must be asserted as important 
in and of themselves if such collaborations are to connect with communities in such as 
way as to empower them in their own search for solutions, and not simply render 
them subject to ‘proven’ interventions. As Lather (2010) asks: 
How do we break the hold of the natural science imaginary and, in Foucault’s 
terms (1982) “refuse what we are” in colluding in the reduction of qualitative 
research to an instrumentalism that meets the demands of audit cultures? 
(p.64).  
 
The scholarly retreat into trying to define the “scientific” merit of qualitative 
research simply in terms of theoretical and methodological standards, rather than in 
wider terms of social robustness and responsiveness to practice, seems to betray a 
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defensiveness and loss of nerve on the part of the scholarly community. We need to 
acknowledge and discuss the imperfections of what we do, rather than attempt to 
legislate them out of existence. We need to embody and enact the deliberative process 
of academic quality assurance, in collaboration with research participants, not 
subcontract it to a committee. Assuring the quality of research, and particularly the 
quality of qualitative research, must be conceptualized as a vital and dynamic process 
that is always subject to further scrutiny and debate. The process cannot be ensconced 
in a single research method or a once-and-for-all set of standards. Furthermore, it 
should be oriented toward risk taking and the production of new knowledge, including 
the generation of new questions (some of which may derive from active engagement 
with research respondents and policy makers) rather than supplication, risk aversion, 
and the production of limited data on effectiveness for a center-periphery model of 
system maintenance (“what works”). 
 
What this means for the actual conduct of social research, particularly 
qualitative research, over the medium to long term is still difficult to say, but various 
examples are emerging. These involve designing studies with collaborating sponsors 
and participants, including policy makers and those “on the receiving end” of policy, 
and talking through issues of validity, warrant, appropriate focus, and trustworthiness 
of the results, rather than trying to establish all of the parameters in advance (see, e.g., 
Fine et. al. 2012; James, 2006; Pollard, 2005, Somekh et al., 2007; Somekh & 
Saunders, 2007; Torrance et al., 2005). As Schorr and Farrow (2011) observe, 
We need to be able to draw on…evaluation combined with…other research, 
theory, practice and…local wisdom (p.7). 
More radically, Fine et. al. (2012) argue that: 
Public science…is…strategic research for organizing campaigns on the 
ground and…[ ]…critical, participatory forms of inquiry, organizing and 
policy development (p. 687). 
Such work can also involve new forms of dissemination and intellectual engagement 
with participants, rather than the simple reporting of “research findings”. Thus for 
example Holmes, MacLure & Jones (2010) have produced a film based on a recent 
research project that seeks to disturb rather than settle the nature of the issues under 
investigation and through such provocation produce new ideas and practices on how 
39 
 
to address the issues from those involved (see also MacLure, Holmes, Macrae and 
Jones 2010). 
 
Such processes are not without their problems or critics of course, especially 
with respect to issues of co-option into a too closely defined “bureaucratic” agenda—
policy makers and sponsors usually being rather more powerful than research 
participants. But in essence, my argument is that if research is to engage critically 
with policy and practice, then research and policy making must progress, both 
theoretically and chronologically, in tandem. Neither can claim precedence in the 
relationship. Research should not simply “serve” policy, far less seek to determine it; 
equally, policy cannot simply “wait” for the results of research. And just as 
participant and practitioner perspectives (often called research “end-users” by policy 
makers) may be used by policy to attempt to discipline the research agenda pursued 
by researchers, equally, such perspectives can be used to critically interrogate policy. 
Research will encompass far more than simply producing policy-relevant findings; 
policy making will include far more than simply disseminating and acting upon 
research results. Where research and policy do cohere, the relationship should be 
pursued as an iterative one, with gains on both sides. 
 
Might this be accomplished in current circumstances? It would likely require a 
dialogue to develop between proponents of experimental design and the field of 
qualitative research, and sharing that dialogue with policymakers. Although 
proponents of RCTs seem to see no need for such a dialogue at present, a further 
wave of RCT disillusionment, following the lack of definitive evidence produced by 
expensive trials, could well see the tide turn again. But rather than simply surfing the 
next wave of enthusiasm for qualitative research, perhaps the opportunity might be 
taken to acknowledge overlapping concerns and interests. Proponents of RCTs 
certainly need to acknowledge that there is more to scientific method than designing 
and evaluating interventions. Equally qualitative researchers might think more openly 
about what experiments in educational and social research should involve. 
Experimentation is about interrupting the taken-for-granted, doing something 
different, trying something out to see what happens, creating the new. It actually has a 
long and distinguished history in qualitative research - through Garfinkel’s 
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experiments in ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) to the origins of action research 
(Lewin 1946, 1947). If we can open up a wider definition of experimental work, 
involving the exploration of new ideas in situ, and combine this with a better 
understanding of scientific method grounded in curiosity, observation, interpretation 
and  judgement, then a dialogue about the purpose and methods of research, and the 
role of research participants in producing knowledge for their own benefit and that of 
their communities, might develop.       
 
Ultimately, the issue revolves around whether or not quality is protected and 
advanced by compliance with a particular set of standards and procedures, or by the 
process of open democratic engagement and debate. Governments, and some within 
the scholarly community itself, seem to be seeking to turn educational and social 
research into a technology that can be applied to solving short-term problems, thereby 
also entrenching the power of the expert in tandem with the state. With respect to 
qualitative research in particular, governments, as noted above, will always require 
detailed knowledge of social issues and how policy is understood and operationalised 
in action. The issue is how to make this engagement a two-way process and produce 
research as a democratic resource in all senses of the word – i.e. involve respondents 
in its production, with all the attendant ethical and local capacity-building issues; and 
have the resultant reports and policies accessible to public debate.  
 
The current debate is being conducted in a research environment influenced by 
the uncertain status and legitimacy of both science and government. Government, and 
the process of mainstream electoral politics, is itself generally unpopular and under 
pressure ‘to deliver’, especially with respect to economic competence and with regard 
to the provision of public services. In such circumstances how appropriate is it for 
social research simply to serve government attempts to influence behavior and 
develop interventions? It is at least arguable that government intervention can dis-
empower communities, and it certainly locates agency in government and 
professional bureaucracies, including those of social science, rather than local 
communities. A different approach would involve social research helping to build 
communities’ capacities to develop themselves, rather than simply providing evidence 
for central policymaking and the development and evaluation of government 
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intervention programs. In this respect it may be the case that deriving legitimacy for 
social research from proximity to government is self-defeating. Such a strategy links 
social research to an inherently unpopular institution and at one and the same 
compromises the basic claim for the legitimacy of science – that of disinterested 
inquiry. Of course many qualitative researchers also want to pursue a social justice 
agenda, not just a scientific agenda, and in so doing engage with government and 
policy. Similarly definitions of what counts as science are changing in any case, as 
reviewed above. But here too, collaborating with local organizations, institutions and 
communities, rather than, or at least in addition to, government, would seem to hold 
much more promise with respect to both the quality of the research and its potential 
‘impact‘ on social and economic life. 
 
An alternative vision proposes research as a system of reflective and engaged 
enquiry that might help practitioners and policy makers think more productively about 
the nature of the problems they face and how they might be better addressed. And in 
fact, the latter process will be as beneficial to policy as to research. Producing 
research results takes time, and, as we have seen above, such results are unlikely to be 
unequivocal. Drawing policy makers and practitioners into a discussion of these 
issues will improve the nature of research questions and research design, while also 
signaling to them that the best evidence available is unlikely ever to be definitive—it 
should inform and educate judgment, but it cannot supplant judgment, nor should it. 
Both the concept and the practice of science and government are under severe 
pressure at present, and ironically, despite all the recent criticisms of qualitative 
research, it is qualitative research that is best placed to recover and advance new 
forms of science and government, precisely because it rests on direct engagement 
with research participants. Many discussions of quality in qualitative research revolve 
around issues of engagement, deliberation, ethical process, and responsiveness to 
participant agendas, along with the need to maintain a critical perspective on both the 
topic at hand and the power of particular forms of knowledge (Denzin 2010; Lincoln, 
1995; Schwandt, 1996; Lather, 2004, 2010; Smith, 2005, Tracy 2010). It is these 
strengths of a qualitative approach that are needed to reinvigorate the research 
enterprise and reconnect it with democratic processes.  
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Notes 
1. See Grissmer, Subotnik, and Orland (2009) for another illustration of the 
significance of qualitative data in focusing research questions and modifying 
the analyses of an experimental study of housing provision 
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